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Abstract
Between 2006 and 2015, approximately 16.2 million homes entered foreclosure, directly
affecting nearly one in six American households (Hall et al., 2015). Yet, the consequences
of foreclosure were not distributed evenly amongst all Americans. The foreclosure rate for
Black Americans was 11%, compared to 6% for white people during the Great Recession
(Hwang et al., 2015). Previous studies point to residential segregation as a driver of the
disproportionate consequences of the crisis borne by minority communities. In Hennepin
County, racial covenants were the first mechanized form of residential segregation. Written
into property deeds, racial covenants prevented anyone who was not white from residing
in or owning the home. By exploiting the exogenous shock of the 1948 Supreme Court
ruling deeming racial covenants unenforceable, I employ a fuzzy regression discontinuity
model to show that covenants impacted foreclosure outcomes during the financial crisis in
the early 2000s. I find evidence that covenanted homes were 15% less likely to foreclose
during the Great Recession.
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Introduction

Between 2006 and 2015, approximately 16.2 million homes entered foreclosure, directly
affecting nearly one in six American households (Hall et al., 2015) and wiping out over $7
trillion in home equity nationwide (Gould and Dastrup, 2012). Yet, the consequences of
foreclosure were not distributed evenly amongst all Americans. The foreclosure rate for
Black Americans was 11% compared to 6% for white people during the Great Recession
(Hwang et al., 2015). Furthermore, the median white family lost 16% of housing wealth
during the foreclosure crisis, while the median Black family lost 53% of housing wealth
(Sullivan et al., 2015). Many studies have pointed to historical housing discrimination as
a culprit for the discrepancy in the negative fallout of the foreclosure crisis (Rugh and
Massey, 2010; Hall et al., 2015; Pedersen and Delgadillo, 2007; Avre, 2014).1 Yet, there
is little known about the causal relationship between racial covenants, one of the earliest
mechanisms of residential segregation, and foreclosure rates during the financial crisis.
Racial covenants were a key mechanism used by private entities to ensure residential
segregation during the first half of the 20th century (Brooks, 2011). Written as clauses
in property deeds, covenants prohibited the sale, resale, or rental of a property to people
who were not white and, therefore, precluded people of color from living in certain areas
of cities (Brooks, 2011; Sood et al., 2019). Judicially enforceable until the unexpected
1948 Supreme Court ruling deeming them unconstitutional, racial covenants aided the
creation of the segregated cities we live in today.
Researchers are increasingly interested in the connection between racial covenants
and residential segregation. However, collecting racial covenant data requires scouring
1

Nationwide, the foreclosure crisis lasted between 2006 and 2015 (Hall et al., 2015). In Minnesota,
the foreclosure crisis spanned 2006-2012 (Minnesota Homeownership Center, 2015).
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deeds to homes built in the first part of the twentieth century. While racial covenant
data is becoming more readily available in cities such as Minneapolis, Seattle, Chicago,
Kansas City, and Philadelphia (Santucci, 2019; Mapping Prejudice Project, 2020), there
has been little empirical research examining their lasting impact on cities. The few
studies that have examined the lasting impact of racial covenants find evidence that
they contribute to the persistent racial wealth gap and present day housing segregation
(Santucci, 2019; Sood et al., 2019; Mapping Prejudice Project, 2020).
In this study, I investigate the causal relationship between racial covenants and
foreclosure outcomes during the foreclosure crisis of the early 2000s. Specifically, this
study expands on the work of Sood, Speagle, and Ehrman-Solberg (2019), who find
racial covenants increased present day property values, to examine the impacts of racial
covenants on foreclosure rates. Previous literature documents the relationships between
higher neighborhood minority populations (Avre, 2014; Hall et al., 2015; Latner, 2017;
Pedersen and Delgadillo, 2007; Rugh and Massey, 2010; Reid and Laderman, 2009) ,
prevalence of investor properties (Gilderbloom et al., 2012; Pedersen and Delgadillo, 2007;
Lin et al., 2009), high-cost loans (Scheessele, 2002; Piskorski and Seru, 2020; Pedersen and
Delgadillo, 2007; Reid and Laderman, 2009; Been et al., 2009) and foreclosure outcomes.
Yet, the literature has not examined the historical legacy of an early mechanism of
residential segregation, racial covenants, and foreclosure outcomes. Combining data
from the Mapping Prejudice Project, Census Bureau, Hennepin County Sheriff’s office,
and the Hennepin County Assessor’s office, I employ a fuzzy regression discontinuity
model to examine covenants long lasting legacy during the foreclosure crisis. I find
evidence that houses with covenants were less likely to experience foreclosure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background and
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a literature review on racial covenants, the racial wealth gap, and foreclosure. Section
3 outlines the conceptual model used in this paper. In Section 4, I present the data.
Section 5 presents the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes and provides suggestions for
future research.

2

Background and Literature Review

2.1

Racial Covenants

The Great Migration witnessed a mass exodus of Black people from the South to northern
cities during the 20th century. Beginning in 1910 and accelerating in the aftermath
of World War I, the Great Migration vastly altered the demographics of northern
and western cities in the United States.2 Within a short period of time, the Black
populations in northern and midwestern cities increased dramatically (Jones-Correa,
2000).3 The increased numbers of Black people inhabiting northern cities lead to tense
labor competition and housing pressure with the established white populations (JonesCorrea, 2000). Attitudes of white supremacy fostered the idea that for a neighborhood
to be stable, it had to be racially homogeneous, meaning it need to remain white
(Kaul, 2019). Ideas about the superiority of racially homogeneous neighborhoods were
propagated by the private real estate industry and homeowners’ associations (Gotham,
2000). These organizations claimed that the very presence of Black families ushered
in neighborhood instability and declining property values (Gotham, 2000). The notion
that the best way to protect the homeowner’s investment was to ensure residential
segregation became widely accepted (Gotham, 2000). These segregationist ideas lead to
2
3

The Great Migration is roughly defined between 1910-1970.
In some cities, the Black population quadrupled during the Great Migration (Jones-Correa, 2000).
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racial covenants (Gotham, 2000; Boustan, 2013).
Racial covenants were a key mechanism used by private entities to maintain
racially homogeneous neighborhoods (Brooks, 2011). Written as clauses in property
deeds, covenants prohibited the sale, resale, or rental of a property to people who
were not white (Brooks, 2011). Realtors were key players in creating the prevalence of
racial covenants. In 1924, the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB)
amended its code of ethics to state that realtors should not be responsible for bringing
people into a neighborhood whose presence would be detrimental to property values
(Gotham, 2000). These actions institutionalized the notion that racial homogeneity
is a natural characteristic of residential neighborhoods and precluded people of color
from living in certain areas of cities (Sood et al., 2019). Ultimately, racial covenants
were designed and implemented to regulate the distribution of the population, direct
resources towards certain areas and away from others, and shape the development of
neighborhoods (Gotham, 2000).
Racial covenants acted as a mechanism of population distribution within many
American cities throughout the first half of the 20th century. While the purpose of
racial covenants remained the same, there were two different avenues in which they were
implemented. The most widely used covenant was proactive, in which builders applied
covenants on tracts of land before the homes were built (Gotham, 2000). The second
type of racial covenant was reactive, written by homeowners’ associations to prevent
Black families from moving into white middle-class neighborhoods (Gotham, 2000).
Whether the covenants were proactive or reactive in nature, their purpose remained the
same: to maintain racially homogeneous neighborhoods within American cities.
In the North, racial covenants were not the first tool used to ensure residential
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segregation. Prior to racial covenants, many northern cities had implemented racially
segregated zoning policies before they were outlawed in 1917 by Supreme Court case
Buchanan v. Warley (Sood et al., 2019). Minneapolis, however, never instituted
racially segregated zoning policy because the city’s expansion started after the Supreme
Court declared racial zoning illegal (Sood et al., 2019). Racial covenants were the first
institutionalized instruments of housing discrimination in the Twin Cities area and
directly impacted the initial spatial demographic distribution (Sood et al., 2019).
During the peak of covenants, over 20% of homes in Hennepin County were
covenanted in the same year they were built (Sood et al., 2019).4 Covenants were
commonplace throughout the country until the Supreme Court declared racial covenants
judicially unenforceable in the 1948 case Shelly v. Kramer (Sood et al., 2019; Rothstein,
2017; Kaul, 2019). However, racial covenants remained legal in Minnesota until the
Minnesota Legislature banned covenants from property deeds in 1953 (Sood et al., 2019).
Yet, by the time housing discrimination by race became illegal, zoning and development
in Hennepin County slowed and started to decline but left behind the mark of residential
segregation (Sood et al., 2019).

2.2

The Racial Wealth Gap and Homeownership

The median net worth of white families is seven times greater than Black families in
the United States (Ashman and Neumuller, 2020; Darity et al., 2018; McKernan et al.,
2014).5 At every echelon of society, Black median wealth is significantly lower than the
median wealth of their white counterparts (Darity et al., 2018; McKernan et al., 2014).
White households living near the poverty line hold $18,000 in wealth, on average, while
4
5

Hennepin County includes the city of Minneapolis.
I define wealth as the value of resources possessed by a family.
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impoverished Black households’ median net worth is near zero (Darity et al., 2018). On
the opposite end of the spectrum, a Black family in the 99th percentile is worth about
$1.5 million while a white family in the 99th percentile amasses wealth over $12 million.6
The racial wealth gap is sustained by differences in initial endowments (Darity
et al., 2018).7 While income is primarily earned in the labor market, wealth building
is driven by intergenerational transfers of resources (Darity et al., 2018; McKernan
et al., 2014). Private intergenerational transfers of wealth include: financial support,
large gifts, and inheritances. Studies have found that Black families are less likely to
receive private transfers than white families (Ashman and Neumuller, 2020; Darity et al.,
2018; McKernan et al., 2014). Ashman and Neumuller (2020) model private transfers
as luxury goods. The richest households—which are predominantly white—have an
incentive to save in order to pass on a greater amount of wealth to the next generation.
Intergenerational transfers of wealth among upper class families happen because these
households can “afford” to bequest their wealth to their children (Ashman and Neumuller,
2020). Ashman and Neumuller (2020) find these voluntary bequests combined with the
cumulative effects of wealth accumulation over multiple generations can explain the
racial wealth gap not accounted for solely by income differences (Ashman and Neumuller,
2020).
Another major factor in explaining the racial wealth gap is differences in homeownership because home equity represents a significant portion of wealth held by the
6

Educational attainment is widely accepted as a vehicle to garner higher earnings over a person’s
lifetime. Families with college-educated heads of household accumulate more wealth than families
with heads of household with lower levels of education over their lifetime (Darity et al., 2018). While
racial differences in income are considerable, they are not nearly as cataclysmic as the racial wealth
gap; the median income of white families is less than two times greater than that of Black households
(Ashman and Neumuller, 2020)). Racial wealth disparities cannot solely be explained by the income
gap (McKernan et al., 2014).
7
I use Darity et al. (2018) definition of initial endowments as the possession of and access to financial
resources.
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average American family (Geisler, 1995; Gudell, 2018). In 2016, a home represented
51.2% of an average homeowner’s wealth in the United States (Gudell, 2018). Home
value appreciation serves as an important wealth generator to pass onto future generations (Kaul, 2019). Therefore, home ownership impacts the trajectory of future
familial wealth generation (Hwang et al., 2015). In the Twin Cities, white households
are three times more likely to own their home than Black households (Metropolitan
Council, 2016). Furthermore, only one-quarter of Black families own their home in
Minneapolis, among the lowest Black homeownership rates in the United States. In
contrast, three-quarters of white families own their homes in Minneapolis, one of the
highest rates of homeownership in the country (Ingraham, 2020). If Black families were
as likely to own their home as white families, the racial wealth gap would shrink by
31 percent (Sullivan et al., 2015). Furthermore, if the returns of homeownership were
equalized, the gap would shrink by another 16% (Sullivan et al., 2015).8
A significant driver of the disparity in homeownership rates is the difference in
initial endowments between Black Americans and white Americans (Darity et al., 2018).
Wachter and Megbolugbe (1992) argue that there are two ways in which wealth impacts
housing tenure choice. First is the standard “wealth effect”, which is equivalent to the
discounted lifetime earnings. Second is that mortgage lenders’ often require a substantial
amount of current wealth for a down payment on a house. A lack of current wealth
increases a household’s probability of renting (Wachter and Megbolugbe, 1992). If
Black families, on average, have lower initial endowments than white families, then
Black families are less likely to be able to build wealth through homeownership. In
fact, Sullivan et al. (2015) find that the number of years a household owns a home
Today, Black homeonwers see less returns in wealth on their real estate investment. For every $1
in wealth that accrues to a Black family as a result of homeownership, white households accrue $1.34
(Sullivan et al., 2015).
8
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explains 27% of the racial wealth gap that is directly attributed to differences in initial
endowments.
Discriminatory practices in the early 20th century helped create the differences in
initial endowments present today. Institutionalized residential segregation, including
racial covenants, precluded minorities from owning homes in certain neighborhoods
necessarily impacted the trajectory of wealth generation within Black communities.
Housing and loan discrimination in the 20th century resulted in many Black Americans
losing the opportunity to build familial wealth through home equity and continues to
contribute the racial wealth gap today.

2.3

Foreclosure

Foreclosure is the legal process by which a lender seizes real property from its owner
due to the owner not making timely mortgage payments (Gilderbloom et al., 2012).
Foreclosure rates rise when house prices fall often because homeowners begin to see
their stock of home equity erode. When house prices begin to decline, borrowers with
little equity start sliding into a position of negative equity in which the borrower owes
the lender more than the property is worth (Frame, 2010).9 A foreclosure sale happens
when the lender auctions the seized property to recover some losses from the defaulted
loan (Gilderbloom et al., 2012). However, not all homes that enter foreclosure result in
a foreclosure sale.10 Even so, six million homes were lost to foreclosure between 2007
9

It makes financial sense for people to stop paying their mortgage when they are underwater.
However, foreclosure can happen even if the homeowner has positive equity.
10
After a homeowner has missed three to six months of mortgage payments, the bank issues a
Notice of Default with the county. The homeowner is then notified that they are at risk of foreclosure.
After receiving the Notice of Default, the homeowner has between 30-120 days to settle their debt.
Homeowners will pay the mortgage balance they owe or opt to enter the short sale process. A short sale
happens when the mortgage lender lets the homeowner sell the property for less than the amount owed
on the mortgage. If the homeowner is unable to pay the dept, then the bank re posses the property,
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and 2017 (Piskorski and Seru, 2020).
In the literature, there are two possible factors to explain why foreclosure happens
on a household level: ability to pay and negative equity (Elmer and Seelig, 1999; Frame,
2010; Gilderbloom et al., 2012; Pedersen and Delgadillo, 2007).11 The ability to pay
explanation posits that homeowners default on their loan and enter foreclosure because
they cannot afford their monthly mortgage payments. In many cases, the inability to
make mortgage payments is preceded by trigger events and or income shocks such as job
loss, a medical crisis or in this case of 2008: adjustable rate mortgages, other subprime
mortgages, and the Great Recession (Elmer and Seelig, 1999; Frame, 2010). From the
negative equity perspective, the key variable in determining mortgage default is the
amount of home equity. The reasoning follows that homeowners with substantial equity
in their homes are less likely to default. Consequently, homeowners with negative equity
or a “higher loan-to-value ratio” are more likely to default (Gilderbloom et al., 2012;
Pedersen and Delgadillo, 2007). In the case of negative equity, it may be more rational
to choose foreclosure because the cost of continuing to pay the mortgage is too high.
The aftermath of a foreclosure brings significant negative consequences at the
household level. The household often witnesses a decline in credit score, lower income,
and housing instability (Diamond et al., 2020; Mykyta and Branch, 2015). Using an
IV approach to examine the impact of foreclosure case filings in Chicago, Diamond,
Guren, and Tan (2020) find that foreclosure filing causes additional debt delinquency
for homeowners. These results suggest that rather than stabilizing a household’s
finances, foreclosure actually causes additional financial instability (Diamond et al.,
evicts the homeowner, and sells the property to a third party (Ericson, 2019).
11
Even if a person has negative equity in a home, it does not necessarily mean they will enter
foreclosure. But, it does make economic sense to enter foreclosure.
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2020). Diamond et al. (2020) find that foreclosure causes the average-foreclosed upon
homeowner to move more than once in a four year time period. Furthermore, households
are significantly less likely to own their residence after a foreclosure (Piskorski and Seru,
2020; Diamond et al., 2020). Using a nationally representative panel dataset comprising
the Survey on Income and Participation (SIPP) data and foreclosure data collected by
RealtyTrac, Mykyta and Branch (2015) finds that families who experience foreclosure
have lower incomes, experience greater food insecurity, are less likely to receive support
from private safety nets, and 1.15 times more likely to participate in government transfer
programs in comparison to households not experiencing foreclosure (Mykyta and Branch,
2015). Foreclosure also causes substantial decreases in individual and family wealth
(Pfeffer et al., 2013; Hall et al., 2015). As home equity represents a significant portion of
wealth held by average American families (Geisler, 1995), the implications of foreclosure
may impact future familial wealth generation.
Although foreclosure occurs on an individual basis, its effects reverberate throughout an entire neighborhood. Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2009) find that the spillover
effect of foreclosures impacts properties near the foreclosure on both a geographic and
temporal level. Foreclosures depress the value of properties within ten blocks and five
years of the foreclosure (Lin et al., 2009). While the presence of foreclosure impacts the
surrounding neighborhood, the concentration of foreclosures determines the magnitude of
the effects. Higher concentrations of foreclosures lead to a domino effect throughout the
neighborhood that may result in neighborhood distress and instability. Each foreclosure
decreases the value of surrounding properties within an eighth of a mile of the foreclosed
property between 1.4 and 1.8% (Avre, 2014; Frame, 2010; Hall et al., 2015; Immergluck
and Smith, 2006). Foreclosures depress surrounding property sales because foreclosed
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properties themselves sell at a discount (Frame, 2010).12 Between 2009 and 2012, the
Center for Responsible Lending estimated that $1.86 trillion was lost due to home values
depreciating as a result of nearby foreclosure (Gilderbloom et al., 2012). Previous studies
find that urban neighborhoods with large concentrations of people of color witness the
highest levels of housing depreciation and largest concentrations of housing foreclosures
(Avre, 2014; Hall et al., 2015; Gilderbloom et al., 2012). If racial covenants segregated
the county and maintained racially homogeneity in certain neighborhoods, then having
a covenant may decrease a property’s likelihood of foreclosure. If covenants decrease the
likelihood of foreclosure then, decades after implementation, they continue to exacerbate
the racial wealth gap because they artificially insulate certain communities from the
detrimental depreciation of wealth resulting from foreclosure.

3
3.1

Conceptual Model
Connecting Racial Covenants and Foreclosure

Many studies point to residential segregation as a driver to the disproportionate impact of
the housing crisis in disadvantaged communities. Today, neighborhoods in Minneapolis
with racial covenants are 79% white, compared to 53% in the city overall (Kaul, 2019).
While racial covenants were the first mechanism of systematic residential segregation,
they are part of a much larger system of institutionalized segregation. Established by the
federal government in 1933, the Homeowners Loan Corporation (HOLC) was designed to
12

There are three primary explanations as to why a property foreclosure discount exists. First,
significant differences in property characteristics in the foreclosed property. Second, lower quality
property conditions. On average, foreclosed-upon homes are of lower quality because distressed
homeowners are less likely to be able to maintain the property. Lastly, sellers of a foreclosed upon
property may be willing to accept a lower price to sell the property more quickly (Frame, 2010).
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reduce mortgage foreclosures. Between 1933 and 1935, the HOLC covered more than one
in ten homes in the United States. The HOLC created maps designed to summarize the
levels of risk associated with lending in different neighborhoods. Black households were
concentrated in the highest risk zone on these maps (Fishback et al., 2020). This process
came to be known as redlining. Rather than driving residential segregation, Fishback
et al. (2020) find that redlining sustained already ingrained residential segregation
within cities. Concurrently, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), created in
1934, provided construction subsidies and federally insured mortgages to streamline
uniform housing construction on a much larger scale, sparking the boom of the suburban
neighborhood (Gotham, 2000). The rise of the suburban neighborhood saw an increase
in the use of the proactive covenant (Gotham, 2000).
The housing discrimination perpetuated by the federal government reinforced
the residential segregation initiated by racial covenants. In turn, property values in
white neighborhoods increased and property values in Black neighborhoods did not.
Not only does residential segregation spatially concentrate certain populations, it also
spatially concentrates wealth (Hwang et al., 2015; Rugh and Massey, 2010). Families
systematically excluded from purchasing a home were denied access to an important
avenue to transfer wealth to future generations (Kaul, 2019). Today, the median value
of homes in heavily covenanted areas is $235,000, $10,000 more than the city as a whole
(Kaul, 2019). Sood et al. (2019) find that covenanted houses have a 15% higher value, on
average, today than properties without covenants. Higher home values usually indicates
that the owner posses higher home equity. The more equity of a property, the lower the
chances of experiencing foreclosure (Gilderbloom et al., 2012; Pedersen and Delgadillo,
2007).
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Figure 1 details the chain of causation between racial covenants and foreclosure.
If covenants systematically segregated the city and redlining sustained that segregation,
then covenants artificially increased property values in white neighborhoods. The higher
property values in certain areas indicates that these homes have higher levels of home
equity, meaning a greater amount of wealth is stored in the investment. Higher levels of
home equity decreases the likelihood of foreclosure.
Figure 1: Chain of Causation

At the neighborhood level, segregation directly impacted the magnitude of the
effects of foreclosure. Given that minorities have lower homeownership rates than white
people, the clusters of minorities in neighborhoods provided the perfect market for
subprime loans (Hwang et al., 2015; Rugh and Massey, 2010).1314 Subprime loans are
widely regarded as a large contributor to the housing bubble and ensuing foreclosure
crisis (Rugh and Massey, 2010). As previously mentioned, the concentration of foreclosures determines the magnitude of their detrimental effects. Segregation racialized the
consequences of the American housing bubble. Nearly 60 years after racial covenants
became illegal in Hennepin County, the divisive intent of covenants persist. The ensuing
13

The term subprime is used to describe a combination of loan, borrower, and lender types with at
least one of the following characteristics: a borrower with a high risk of default, low credit scores, a
history of delinquent payments, and/or bankruptcy, a loan with high and adjustable interest rates,
payment, fees, etc., and a lender specializing in high-cost loans and high-risk borrowers (Latner, 2017).
14
Appendix A discusses the rise of subprime loans and why they are concentrated in majority-minority
communities.
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fallout from the foreclosure crisis disproportionately impacted communities of color and
the consequences of racial covenants persist today.

4

Data

To identify the impact of racial covenants on foreclosure, I combine several data sources
into a cross sectional analysis at the property level. Given that racial covenants were
written into deeds in the first part of the twentieth century and that the foreclosure crisis
occurred in the early part of the twenty-first century, my data span multiple different
levels and time frames.

4.1

Racial Covenant Data

The first racial covenant in Hennepin County appeared in 1910 and by 1955, 22,218 racial
restrictive deeds had been written for unique properties throughout the county. Racial
covenants were judicially enforceable until the 1948 Supreme Court ruling deemed them
unconstitutional. However, including racially restrictive language in property deeds
remained legal in Minnesota until the 1953 Minnesota Legislature ruling deemed racial
covenants illegal (Brooks, 2011). The racial covenant data comes from the Mapping
Prejudice Project at the University of Minnesota.
The Mapping Prejudice Project has amassed a comprehensive dataset examining
the prevalence of racial covenants throughout Hennepin County. To collect the data, the
organization enlisted volunteers to scour deeds of every property built in the first part of
the twentieth century. The Mapping Prejudice Project released the racial covenant data
for homes built between 1910 and 1955 in January 2020 (Mapping Prejudice Project,
14

Figure 2: Sample Deed

Note: This deeds provides an example of the language of racially restrictive covenants.
Source: Mapping Prejudice Project
2020). The geocoded dataset includes the location of covenanted properties, the date the
deed was written, the grantor, the grantee, and the specific racially restrictive language
written into the property deed.15 While the dataset is geocoded, addresses for specific
properties are not included. In order to look at specific properties, I spatially join this
geocoded dataset with Hennepin County tax assessor data.
I restrict my analysis to single unit housing as racial covenants were predominantly written into deeds for single family homes (Sood et al., 2019; Santucci, 2019).
Additionally, my sample only includes homestead properties.16 Understanding whether
or not a property is a homestead is important because the literature documents that
owner occupied homes are less likely to experience foreclosure due to having a lower
likelihood of having a high-cost loan (Gilderbloom et al., 2012; Avre, 2014).17
While racial covenants were written between 1910-1955, I have restricted my
regression sample to houses built between 1945-1951 for empirical purposes discussed
in the Empirical Results section of the paper. In total, my sample includes 26,272
15

Geocoding assigns the geographical coordinates that correspond to a location
A property is considered a homestead if it is the owner’s primary residence. If the property is
occupied by a renter, it is not a homestead.
17
The vast majority of homes built between 1945-1951 are homesteads. Only 5.58% of homes built
within the six year time frame are not owner occupied in Hennepin County.
16

15

properties built between 1945-1951. Of those properties, 6,290 have covenants. A key
aspect of my identification strategy is that the houses built between 1945-1951 are
well distributed throughout the county in order to capture enough variation to clearly
identify the impact that covenants have on foreclosures decades in the future. Figure
3 demonstrates the location of properties in my sample and shows that they are well
distributed throughout the county. Figure 4 shows where covenants homes are located
in my sample. Covenants are concentrated in south Minneapolis and in the surrounding
suburbs. Figure 5 displays the proportion of houses built within each year of my sample
that have covenants. In my sample overall, 24% of homes are covenanted.

16

Figure 3: Properties built 1945-1951 in Hennepin County

Note: The location of the 26,272 properties built between 1945-1951 throughout
Hennepin County are represented by the black dots in the map. The city of
Minneapolis is outlined in blue.

17

Figure 4: Racial Covenants Executed in Houses Built Between 1945-1951 Hennepin
County

Note: Of the 26,272 properties built between 1945-1951 in Hennepin County, 6,290
have covenants. The red represents the location of the covenanted properties. The city
of Minneapolis is outlined in blue.
18

Figure 5: Proportion of Properties with Racial Covenants

Note: In the sample overall, 24% of houses built between 1945-1951 are covenanted
Source: Mapping Prejudice Project
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4.2

Foreclosure Data

My dependent variable of interest is a binary variable and equals one if the property
experienced a foreclosure at any time during the foreclosure crisis. According to a report
from the Minnesota Homeownership Center, foreclosure rates reached the lowest levels
experienced since 2005 in 2013 (Minnesota Homeownership Center, 2015). Therefore,
for the purposes of my analysis, I consider the foreclosure crisis to span 2006 to 2012,
inclusive of both years. Between 2006-2012, 36,950 foreclosure sales happened in
Hennepin County. Within my restricted sample of houses built between 1945-1951, 1,246
houses experienced foreclosure during the foreclosure crisis. Figure 6 shows the location
of foreclosed homes throughout Hennepin County in yellow. The average foreclosure
rate during the foreclosure crisis for homes built between 1945-1951 was 4.7%. Of the
properties that experienced foreclosure, 229 or 18.37% had racial covenants.
Foreclosure sales data is public information accessible through the Hennepin
County Sheriff’s office. The dataset includes: sale date, sale amount, property address,
seller, and buyer. For the purposes of my analysis, I am interested in the property
address and the date of foreclosure. While the dataset is comprehensive, it only includes
properties that experienced a foreclosure sale. Not every home that enters foreclosure
results in a foreclosure sale (Piskorski and Seru, 2020). Therefore, the causal impact
of racial covenants on foreclosure may be a lower-bound because my regression only
accounts for properties that foreclosed rather than properties affected by the foreclosure
process.

20

Figure 6: Foreclosures of 1945-1951 Homes in Hennepin County

Note: 1,246 out 26,272 properties built between 1945-1951 experienced foreclosure at
some point during the foreclosure crisis. The location of these properties is represented
by the yellow triangles. The city of Minneapolis is outlined in blue.
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Figure 7: Foreclosed Properties by Covenant

Note: 1,246 homestead properties built between 1945-1951 foreclosed during the
financial crisis; only 229 properties had racial covenants.
Source: Mapping Prejudice Project and Hennepin County Sheriff

4.3

Property Level Control Variables

Every year, the Hennepin County Assessor’s office releases parcel data for each individual
property in the county. The data include individual home characteristics such as
estimated home value, the year the house was built, lot size, school district, number
of bedrooms, homestead information, etc..18 For my analysis, I use parcel data from
2005, before the beginning of the foreclosure crisis. The data from the Hennepin County
Assessor’s office serves two purposes. First, I use the data to restrict my sample to
homestead properties built between 1910-1955 that are still standing in 2005. Houses
built during this time had a positive probability of being covenanted and may also be
18

A property is considered a homestead if it is the owner’s primary residence. If the property is
occupied by a renter, it is not a homestead.
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impacted during the foreclosure crisis. Secondly, the Assessor data provides important
property-level control variables.
Individual property characteristics are important control variables to investigate
the causal relationship between covenants and foreclosure. The main property level
variable of interest is home value in 2005. Property value may be correlated with both
the likelihood of foreclosure and racial covenants. Therefore, if not included as a control
variable, my regression would suffer from omitted variable bias and I would not be able
to clearly identify a causal relationship between racial covenants and foreclosure. Home
value is correlated with other property characteristics such as number of bedrooms, lot
size, and school district. Therefore, I only include home value in my regression.
Table 1: Property Level Descriptive Statistics by Foreclosure

Variable

(1)
No Foreclosure
Mean/SE

(2)
Foreclosure
Mean/SE

T-test
Difference
(1)-(2)

2005 Property Value ($)

218,391.6
182,257.5
36,259***
(127,322.6)
(68,989.96)
Year Deed Executed
1946
1947
-0.653***
(6.565)
(5.911)
Observations
24,932
1,246
Note: The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

Table 1 describes the average differences in individual property characteristics
between homes that experienced foreclosure and those that did not. The largest difference
is the average home value of the property. Houses that did not experience foreclosure
have an average value of $218,000 while the average value of homes that experienced
foreclosure is $182,000. This result is consistent with the literature. Owners in homes
with higher home values tend to have higher incomes and are less likely to have high
cost loans which are factors that decrease the property’s risk of foreclosure (Avre, 2014;
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Gilderbloom et al., 2012; Diamond et al., 2020).
Table 2: Property Level Descriptive Statistics by Covenant

Variable

(1)
No Covenant
Mean/SE

(2)
Covenant
Mean/SE

T-test
Difference
(1)-(2)

2005 Property Value ($)

214,215.2
225,018.6
-10813.73***
(127,213.9)
(118,562.6)
Year Deed Executed
1948
1939
9.00***
(1.932)
(9.728)
Observations
19,982
6,290
Note: The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

Table 2 shows the average differences of individual property characteristics between
covenanted properties and non-covenanted properties. The most notable difference
between covenanted properties and non covenanted properties is the year the deed was
executed. As discussed earlier in the paper, deeds with racially restrictive language
were often executed years before building a house on the lot. Therefore, it is not
surprising that the average date the deed was executed is 10 years earlier on houses with
covenants that on houses without covenants. Additionally, the average property value
of covenanted properties is about $10,000 higher than properties without a covenant.
This is consistent with the results of Sood et al. (2019), who find that the 2018 property
value is higher in properties with a covenant than properties without a covenant, on
average.

4.4

Neighborhood Control Variables

Neighborhood control variables are necessary to parse out a causal relationship between
racial covenants and foreclosure. I use information at the census tract level collected
through the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS). Within Hennepin County there
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are nearly 300 census tracts. Each tract has a population of roughly 4,000 people.19
The ACS data is constructed as five year averages, which means the data available
for the 2010 ACS was collected from 2006-2010. While the 2010 ACS does not span
the entirety of the foreclosure crisis, is does provide the most comprehensive control
dataset throughout the time period. My control variables at the census tract level
include: proportion of the population that is white, proportion of the population under
18, median income, housing occupancy rate, population, and population density. Each of
the control variables is correlated with the likelihood of foreclosure, therefore excluding
them from my regressions would result in biased estimates.20
Tables 3 and 4 investigate the neighborhood characteristics between foreclosed
and not foreclosed properties as well as covenanted and non-covenanted properties.
There are significant differences for every neighborhood ccontrol variable. The most
important is the percent of the population that is white and median income. Between
foreclosed properties and properties without foreclosure, the white population and median
household incomes are higher for properties not experiencing foreclosure. Between
covenanted and noncovenanted properties, the white population and median household
incomes are higher for properties with covenants. While these results are not causal,
they are both consistent with the literature.
In addition to present day neighborhood control variables, I need to include control
variables during the time when covenants were written into property deeds. However,
19

4,000 people may be too large to classify as a neighborhood. However, I have chosen to conduct my
analysis at the census tract level for a few different reasons. First, block group data is only available
through the decennial census, meaning that control variable data would be in from the 2000 census
or the 2010 census which do not capture the timeframe of interest. Secondly, using block group data
masks some variation as foreclosure is relatively uncommon.
20
A higher proportion of the population that is white, higher median income, and higher housing
occupancy rate are correlated with a lower likelihood of foreclosure. A higher proportion of the
population that is under 18 and higher population density are correlated with a higher likelihood of
foreclosure.
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Table 3: 2010 Census Tract Descriptive Statistics by Foreclosure

Variable

(1)
No Foreclosure
Mean/SE

(2)
Foreclosure
Mean/SE

T-test
Difference
(1)-(2)

Population

3,805.874
3,621.491
18.656***
(1,187.365)
(1073.318)
Population Over 18 (%)
78.111
77.370
0.7433***
(4.659)
(5.597)
White Population (%)
80.769
70.957
9.81***
(13.523)
(20.093)
Housing Occupancy Rate (%)
94.982
92.003
2.98***
(3.837)
(6.312)
Median Income ($)
81,931
69,877
12,070.4***
(27,031)
(24,181)
Population Density (per mile)
4,224.358
4,805.095
-577.56***
(1,696.628)
(2,001.377)
Observations
24,932
1,246
Note: The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

Table 4: 2010 Census Tract Descriptive Statistics by Covenant

Variable

(1)
No Covenant
Mean/SE

(2)
Covenant
Mean/SE

T-test
Difference
(1)-(2)

Population

3,785.101
3,836.17
-50.98**
(1,202.288)
(1,114.635)
Population Over 18 (%)
77.963
78.442
-0.479***
(4.786)
(4.433)
White Population (%)
79.679
82.281
-2.60***
(14.797)
(11.147)
Housing Occupancy Rate (%)
94.696
95.306
-0.61***
(4.266)
(3.152)
Median Income ($)
80,143
85,281
-5,135.77***
(26,624)
(27,841)
Population Density (per mile)
4,189.359
4,463.857
-274.697***
(1,797.748)
(1,404.56)
Observations
19,982
6,290
Note: The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

the data is only available for the city of Minneapolis. Therefore, I use these controls
in my regressions restricted to Minneapolis but exclude them in my Hennepin County
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regressions. These results are presented in Appendix C.

4.5

Threats to Identification

As documented by previous literature, the prevalence of high cost loans within a neighborhood is a key explanatory variable of neighborhood foreclosure rates (Gilderbloom
et al., 2012). While the necessity of home mortgage data is not as prudent because
my sample only includes homestead properties, controlling for the spillover effects of
foreclosure within a neighborhood necessitates the inclusion of high cost mortgage data
at the tract level. Unfortunately, census tract level home loan information is not readily
available. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) offers the most extensive public
dataset of home mortgage information in the United States. However, the loan type
information only provides vague descriptions and does not specifically state the specific
type of mortgage obtained. The Survey of Consumer Finances is a nationally representative survey that includes mortgage information. However, the survey is nationally
representative and does not provide census tract information. Lastly, the Mortgage
Bankers Association has specific home loan data, but the data is not accessible to the
public. Therefore, this information is not included in my regressions and the omission
may positively bias my results.
Another threat to identification is that the placement of racial covenants was not
random. Brooks (2011) finds that houses with mid-range home values were more likely
to be covenanted. High-end homes were not as likely to be covenanted because the price
of the house excluded many minorities from moving into the neighborhood; covenants
were not necessary to maintain a racially homogeneous neighborhood. Therefore, racial
covenants were more likely to be placed in middle income neighborhoods. The inclusion
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of property value as a control variable at the time the house was built might mitigate
some of the bias associated with the non-random assignment of covenants. However,
individual property value is not available. I have the average census tract property
value from 1950 for the city of Minneapolis obtained from the Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series National Historical Geographic Information System (IPUMS NHGIS)
(Manson et al., 2020). While I include this variable in my Minneapolis regressions, the
value of the property in 1950 has already been impacted by covenants.21

4.6

Covenant Effectiveness

Racial covenants systematically segregated Hennepin County. Looking at the impact
covenants had on present day neighborhood demographics provides insight into their
long lasting legacy. Table 5 demonstrates that increasing the covenant rate at the 2010
census tract by 1% increases the percent of the population that is white by 16%. This
is consistent with Sood et al. (2019) where they find that a 1% increase in covenanted
houses within a census block, reduces the Black resident rates by 19% in 2018.22 Figure
8 demonstrates that in 2010, minority populations in Hennepin County are concentrated
in areas without covenants.23 The regression and the map suggest that covenants
were successful in segregating Hennepin County, especially Minneapolis. As covenants
successfully segregated the city and county, then populations disproportionately impacted
by the foreclosure crisis may be spatially concentrated. If this is true, then the absence
21

As a falsification test discussed in Appendix E, I exclude high property values from my Minneapolis
sample. The my results are robust to this specification.
22
A census block is a more granular level of observation than a census tract. On average, a census
block contains a population of 600 while a census tract represents 4,000 people.
23
The periphery of Hennepin County is quite rural. While there are very few racial covenants in the
area, the population is overwhelmingly white. However, this makes sense as minority communities
predominately live in Minneapolis or the surrounding suburbs.
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of racial covenants will likely exacerbate the effects of foreclosure and the foreclosure
rate in these neighborhoods because the magnitude of the foreclosure rate is dependent
on the concentration of foreclosures.
Table 5: Covenants and Racial Composition
Tract Covenant Rate

.1634**
(0.074)
Constant
0.6756***
(0.013)
Observations
290
Note: In Hennepin county, a 1% increase in the covenant rate within a census tract increases the
percent of the population that is white by 16%.
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Figure 8: Racial Covenants and Population Distribution Today

Note: This map examines the location of racial covenants and population distribution
in 2010.
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4.7

Foreclosure Rate and Neighborhood Racial Composition

The literature documents that neighborhoods with higher minority population witnessed
higher foreclosure rates during the Great Recession. Table 6 demonstrates that a 1%
increase in the percent of the tract population that is white leads to a decrease in the
foreclosure rate by .2%. To accurately interpret the magnitude of the coefficient, we
need to compare the decrease in the foreclosure rate to the mean foreclosure rate, which
is 4.7%. Therefore, increasing the proportion of the tract population that is white by
1%, decreases the tract foreclosure rate by a magnitude of 4.255%.24
Table 6: Foreclosure Rate and Census Tract Racial Composition
Proportion of the Tract that is White (%)

-.2044593***
(0.058)
Constant
0.200***
(0.043)
Observations
290
Note: In Hennepin County, a 1% increase in the percent of the census tract population that is white
decreases the census tract foreclosure rate by 0.2%.

5

Empirical Results

The mechanism connecting racial covenants and foreclosure is property value. We need
to understand how covenants impact property value. Figure 7 shows that the value of
covenanted properties is between $2,350-$10,800 (dependent on specification) higher
than properties without a covenant, on average in 2005. This is consistent with the
results of Sood et al. (2019), who find that the 2018 property value is $10,000 higher in
properties with a covenant than properties without a covenant, on average.
24

Calculated by dividing the coefficient, .2%, by the mean foreclosure rate, 4.7%.
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Table 7: Covenants and Property Values
Covenant ($)
Zip Code Indicator
Tract Controls
Race Control
Observations

5.1

10,803.42***
(1,744.87)
N
N
N
26,272

3,103.68**
(1,609.95)
N
Y
Y
26,272

2177.84
(1529.07)
Y
Y
Y
26,272

3,067.23**
(1,491.2)
N
Y
N
26,272

2349.43*
(1334.76)
Y
Y
N
. 26,272

Linear Probability Model

My empirical strategy closely follows Sood et al. (2019). However, instead of estimating
home values in the present day, I am estimating the likelihood of foreclosure. My
regressor of interest is a dummy variable indicating indicating whether or not the
property was covenanted. The dependent variable is the probability of foreclosure on
the property at any point during the foreclosure crisis.25

p̂(y = 1|x) = Yijt = β0 + β1 Covenantsj + β2 Cjt + β3 Dit + ρn + ijt

(1)

In equation 1, I am predicting the likelihood of foreclosure, Y, of an individual
household j located in a census tract i in present-day time period t (2006-2012 for
my outcome variable and 2006-2010 for my independent variables). My coefficient of
interest is β1 , Cjt is a vector of 2010 census tract control variables, Dit is a vector of
2005 individual property controls, and ρn is a zip code indicator variable.
25

I define the foreclosure crisis as 2006-2012 for the purposes of this study.
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5.2

Linear Probability Model Results

To investigate the relationship between racial covenants and foreclosure, I initially
employ a naive linear probability model. The main explanatory variable of interest is a
binary variable indicating whether or not the property was covenanted and the outcome
variable is the probability of foreclosure. Racial covenants were written into property
deeds between 1910-1955. However, comparing houses built throughout a 45 year time
frame is not empirically feasible because there are time variant characteristics between
houses built in 1910 and houses built in 1955 which impact the likelihood of being
covenanted. For instance, community acceptance of racial covenants is likely different
throughout this whole time frame.26 Therefore, I run a preliminary linear probability
model specified within a narrow time frame, 1945-1951, with the underlying assumption
that houses built within this short period of time will not be different due to time
variant characteristics. The results of different specifications of control variables and
zip code indicators are shown in Table 8. Including control variables in my regression
is necessary because there are many other factors that contribute to the likelihood of
foreclosure. If these variables are not included, my regression will suffer from omitted
variable bias and likely overestimate the effect of covenants. Appendix C displays the
results from regressions restricted to Minneapolis with the inclusion of past controls.
Columns 3 and 5 shows a specification where I exclude race as a control variable.
Running a regression with race excluded as a control variable is important because
controlling for race might mask the effect of racial covenants. If racial covenants
successfully segregated Hennepin County, then the proportion of the population that is
white would likely increase as the proportion of covenants increased. Thus, controlling for
26

I run a linear probability model for all houses built between 1910-1955. The results are presented
in Appendix B.
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Table 8: Hennepin County Linear Probability Model Properties Built 1945-1951 Regressions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
-0.014*** -0.006** -0.006** -0.007** -0.007**
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
Zip Code Indicator
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Tract Controls
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Race Control
N
Y
N
Y
N
Household Control
N
Y
Y
N
N
Observations
26272
26272
26272
26272
26272
Note: The dependent variable is the likelihood of foreclosure. The control variables are omitted from
the table for brevity. Property level control is 2005 property value. 2010 census tract controls include:
population, percent of the tract under 18, proportion of the population that is white, housing
occupancy rate, median income, and tract population density.
Covenant

race might take out the variation necessary to isolate the impact of covenants. However,
these regressions display similar results as the regressions where race is included.
Property value is a variable that needs to be examined in the context of my
regressions. If I do not include property value as a control variables, then my regression
may overestimate the effect of covenants on foreclosure. However, property value is
likely a mechanism between covenants and foreclosures as racial covenants systematically
increased property values. In turn, property values impact the likelihood of foreclosure.
Therefore, if I control for property value in my regression, then I might take out the
variation necessary to isolate the impact of covenants on foreclosure rates. Columns 4
and 5 display the regression results.
The results of my regressions remain robust throughout all of my specifications.
Covenants decrease the likelihood of foreclosure. In order to make sense of the coefficients,
we must compare them to the foreclosure rate in the sample, 4.7%. After comparing
the coefficients to the mean, the likelihood of foreclosure decreases between 13%-29%,
dependent on the specification, on homes with a racial covenant.27
27

Calculated by dividing .006/.007/.014 (the decrease in the likelihood of foreclosure) by .047 (the
mean foreclosure rate).
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However, I cannot use a simple linear probability model to identify the causal
link between covenants and foreclosure for a few different reasons. First and foremost,
covenant assignment is not random. There is an endogenous relationship between
unobserved quality characteristics of the location/property and the likelihood of being
covenanted. These same unobserved quality characteristics may also be correlated with
the likelihood of foreclosure during the financial crisis. Furthermore, there is some
evidence that properties that were covenanted were more likely to happen in areas with
low natural amenities and were often more affordable (Sood et al., 2019). Low natural
amenities areas may also be correlated with higher probabilities of foreclosure. To break
the endogenous relationship, I implement a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, similar
to Sood et al. (2019), to isolate the effects of covenants on foreclosure.

5.3

Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity

Regression discontinuity models rely on a cutoff point in time to determine treatment.
In a fuzzy regression discontinuity, there is a positive probability of treatment before the
cutoff and after the cutoff, the probability of treatment drops to zero. The 1948 Supreme
Court ruling deeming racial covenants unenforceable provides an ideal scenario to run a
fuzzy regression discontinuity. While the Supreme Court Ruling made racial covenants
judicially unenforceable, it did not deem covenants illegal. Covenants could still be
written after 1948, but they were no longer enforceable. In my study, I focus specifically
on homes built within a narrow time period before and after the 1948 Supreme Court
Ruling. The underlying assumption is that houses built within a narrow time period will
not have underlying quality differences, therefore overcoming my primary endogeneity
concern.
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While restricting my sample to houses built between 1945-1951 is necessary to
overcome omitted variable bias, assigning likelihood of treatment based on the year the
deed was executed is crucial. Although racial covenants are most often written into
deeds in the same year the house is built, covenants can be written into deeds at any
time. For instance, many property developers bought lots and wrote racial covenants
into deeds years before building a house on the property. Conversely, some racially
restrictive deeds were written after the house had been built. Therefore, assigning the
probability of being treated with a racial covenant comes from the year the deed was
executed and not the year the house was built. Using the combined parcel and covenant
data, I determine the homes built right before and right after the 1948 ruling that are
still standing in 2005. In the fuzzy regression discontinuity model, properties with deeds
executed before the 1948 cutoff point had a positive probability of being covenanted
and homes with deeds executed after 1948 had a zero probability of having a judicially
enforceable covenant.
Figure 9 displays pre-treatment and post-treatment trends fitted with a quadratic
time trend. The validity of regression discontinuity estimates hinges on whether polynomial models provide an adequate estimation of what we see in the data. If the polynomial
model does not accurately describe the trends of treatment, then what looks like a jump
due to treatment may be unaccounted for non-linearity in the counterfactual (Angrist
and Pischke, 2008). However, in Figure 9 we see that there is a gap in the number of
covenants written into deeds built before and after the 1948 ruling in Hennepin County,
indicating that the exogenous shock changed behavior of property developers after
the ruling which suggests that this is an appropriate shock to induce randomization.28
28
The local average treatment effect (LATE) is determined from homes built immediately before
and immediately after the Supreme Court Ruling. Appendix D discusses a key assumption behind the
validity my model.

36

Figure 9: Hennepin County Regression Discontinuity Graph

Note: The regression discontinuity graph of houses built within a six year timeframe of
the 1948 Supreme Court ruling demonstrates that there is a visible gap between the
number of houses built on covenanted lots per year before and after the 1948 Supreme
Court ruling.
However, it is important to acknowledge that the use of covenants does not drop to zero
after the 1948 ruling because while covenants were deemed unenforceable, they were
still legal until 1953. It is likely that there are social factors influencing decisions to
continue to place covenants on homes after they are no longer judicially enforceable.
Unfortunately, measuring these is extremely difficult. Another contributing factor as to
why the use of covenants does not drop to zero, is that the year the deed was executed
does not necessarily align with the year the house was built. For example, a property
developer may buy a lot in 1940, include a racial covenant in the property deed, and
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then not built the house until 1949. In this graph, the variable on the x-axis the year
the house was built to account for endogenous quality characteristics described above.
However, houses built after the ruling may include houses with covenants executed
before the ruling.

5.4

Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Model

The fuzzy RD acts as a two stage instrumental variable regression in which I am
predicting the likelihood of having a covenant determined by the year the deed was
executed.29

ˆ
p̂(y = 1|x) = Yijt = β0 + β1 Covenant
sj + β2 Cjt + β3 Dit + ρn + ijt

(2)

ˆ
Covenant
sj = γ0 + γ1 pre1949 + f Y ear + sj

(3)

In equation 2, I am predicting the likelihood of foreclosure, Y, of an individual
household j located in a census tract i in present-day time period t (2006-2012 for
my outcome variable and 2006-2010 for my independent variables). My coefficient of
interest is β1 which represents whether or not the property was covenant eligible, Cjt is a
vector of 2010 census tract control variables, Dit is a vector of 2005 individual property
controls, and ρn is a zip code indicator variable. Equation 3, states than an individual
29

The Kleibergen-Paap test for underidentification and the Cragg-Donald Wald test for weak identification both demonstrate that year the deed was executed is a good instrument for covenants. If
anything, year of deed execution may over identify covenants. Only about 20% of my sample is
covenanted, however, the instrument indicates the likelihood of being covenanted in about 70% if the
house is eligible.

38

property’s probability of receiving treatment is determined by the deed being executed
before 1949 and a nonlinear time trend of the year the house was built. The nonlinear
time trend accounts for unobserved quality changes of the properties built within the
time frame. In other words, the nonlinear time trend captures variation of houses built
within the six-year time frame except for the racial covenant.

5.5

Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Results

After running my regressions subject the the fuzzy regression discontinuity specifications,
I find that covenants are still significant in reducing the likelihood of foreclosure. The
columns in Table 9 follow the same format as Table 8 to show that my results remain
significant with different control variable specifications. My preferred specification is
displayed in Column 5 because I do not include property value nor race in the regression.
Including these variables likely masks to effect of racial covenants on the likelihood of
foreclosure for reason discussed earlier in the paper. To understand the magnitude to
which racial covenants decrease the likelihood of foreclosure, we must compare the the
coefficient on the binary covenant variable to the average foreclosure rate, 4.7%. I find
that racial covenants decrease the likelihood of foreclosure by 15% at the 5% significance
level for my preferred specification presented in Column 5.303132
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Calculated by dividing .007 (the decrease in the likelihood of foreclosure) by .047 (the mean
foreclosure rate).
31
An important concern is that I might be attributing the impact that other causes of residential
segregation have on foreclosure outcomes to racial covenants. To test the explanatory power of the
1948 Supreme Court ruling, I run a falsification test discussed in Appendix E. My results indicate that
covenants do explain some of the variation of foreclosure outcomes in the early 2000s.
32
Another important question is whether or not racial covenants have predictive power in explaining
foreclosure within minority communities. I explore this in Appendix E.
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Table 9: Hennepin County Fuzzy RD Property Level Regressions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
-0.014*** -0.009 -0.009* -0.009* -0.007**
(0.005)
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
(0.003)
Zip Code Indicator
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Tract Controls
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Race Control
N
Y
N
Y
N
Household Control
N
Y
Y
N
N
Observations
26272
26272
26272
26272
26272
Note: The control variables are omitted from the table for brevity. Property level control is 2005
property value. 2010 census tract controls include: population, percent of the tract under 18,
proportion of the population that is white, housing occupancy rate, median income, and tract
population density
Covenant
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6

Conclusion

The foreclosure crisis of the early 2000s, directly affected nearly 20% of American
households (Hall et al., 2015). However, the fallout of the crisis was disproportionately
borne by minority communities. To understand why marginalized communities were
hit hardest by this crisis, we need to examine the long history of systematic residential
segregation. Previous literature investigating the causes of foreclosure point to residential
segregation as a driver of minority communities bearing the brunt of the foreclosure
crisis (Gilderbloom et al., 2012; Avre, 2014; Pedersen and Delgadillo, 2007; Rugh and
Massey, 2010). In Hennepin County, racial covenants were the first institutionalized
mechanism of residential segregation. Combining data from the Mapping Prejudice
Project, Census Bureau, Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office, and the Hennepin County
Assessor’s office, I employ a fuzzy regression discontinuity model to investigate the
relationship between racial covenants deployed in early 20th century and foreclosure
outcomes in the early 2000s. I find evidence that houses with covenants were less likely
to foreclose during the financial crisis.
My work expands on the findings of Sood et al. (2019) who examine the long
lasting implications of racial covenants in Minneapolis. The researchers find that
racial covenants increased 2018 property values by 15% compared to homes without
covenants and that a 1% increase in covenanted houses in a census block decreases
Black homeownership by 19% in Minneapolis (Sood et al., 2019). Sood et al. (2019)
findings suggest that during the first part of the 20th century, covenants successfully
segregated the county, not only distributing people, but also systematically distributing
wealth and resources. Covenants spatially concentrated wealth in white communities,
which helps explain the disproportionate consequences of the foreclosure crisis being
41

concentrated in minority neighborhoods. In the United States, there are significant
inequities concerning the distribution of wealth. A white family in this country posses
seven times more wealth, on average, than a Black family. If the goal of policymakers is
to address the racial wealth gap, we must first understand what has contributed to the
discrepancy in the first place.
Although my results indicate a negative causal relationship between racial covenants
and likelihood of foreclosure, there are limitations to my study. First, although racial
covenants were used throughout the northern U.S. during the early 20th century, I
only use data from Hennepin County in Minnesota. The lack of geographic diversity
may render my results internally valid but not externally valid. Future research should
investigate the relationship between covenants and foreclosure in different areas of the
country. Secondly, my control variables are aggregated to the census tract level. As
the census tract represents 4,000 people on average, it may be too large to accurately
represent a neighborhood. I may be losing a lot of variation within census tracts.
However, as block group data for all of my control variables is not available through the
American Community Survey, I am constrained by the data. Lastly, racial covenants
are only a piece of the story in understanding the discrepancies in wealth and resources
between white and Black communities. Other mechanisms of residential segregation,
both social and institutional, factor into the segregated cities we live in today. Yet, racial
covenants were the first mechanized of institutionalized, legal residential segregation in
the Twin Cities and are therefore important to understand when thinking about the
role of governments in maintaining residential segregation and the racial wealth gap.
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Appendix A

Subprime Loans and the Securities Based
Mortgage System

At the neighborhood level, segregation directly impacted the magnitude of the effects of
foreclosure. Given that minorities have lower homeownership rates than white people,
the clusters of minorities in neighborhoods provided the perfect market for subprime
loans (Hwang et al., 2015; Rugh and Massey, 2010). Subprime loans are widely regarded
as a large contributor to the housing bubble and ensuing foreclosure crisis (Rugh and
Massey, 2010). In the years leading up to the financial crisis, minorities were substantially
more likely than white people to hold high-interest or otherwise risky mortgages (Hall
et al., 2015). A report published in 2002 by The U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) found that subprime loans were 5 times more frequent in
predominantly Black neighborhoods than predominantly white communities (Scheessele,
2002).
To understand why residential segregation intensified the effects of the housing
bubble, we must understand the securities based mortgage system. Prior to the 1980s,
lenders avoided minority neighborhoods primarily due to institutionalized discrimination
(Rugh and Massey, 2010). However, securitized mortgages changed the mortgage market
from a “bank-based intermediary credit system into a securities-based market system”
(Rugh and Massey, 2010). Traditionally, the number of mortgages given was based
on the amount of money a bank had to lend. However, in the securities-based system
the number of mortgages is based on “potential borrowers and investors’ willingness to
purchase mortgage-backed securities” and therefore incentivized banks to expand their
pool of borrowers (Rugh and Massey, 2010). Mortgages were then divided into tranches
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on the basis of risks. Because any mortgage could be sold and repackaged, the “risky
borrowers” who were historically denied access to housing loans became attractive as an
expanded pool of borrowers (Rugh and Massey, 2010). Therefore, targeted predatory
lending in minority neighborhoods became common place (Rugh and Massey, 2010).

Appendix B

1910-1955 Regressions

The regression results from including all properties built between 1910-1955 are consistent
with my primary specifications. As demonstrated in Table 10, racial covenants decrease
the likelihood of foreclosure at the 1% significance level in all of my regressions. To
understand the magnitude to which covenants decrease foreclosure, we must compare
the regression coefficient to the average foreclosure rate. Within this larger sample, the
average foreclosure rate is 5.86%. Dependent on the specification, covenants decrease
the likelihood of foreclosure by 12%-51.19%.33 This robustness check is necessary to
be sure that the negative causal relationship between racial covenants and likelihood
of foreclosure does not only hold for properties built between 1945-1951, but that it
remains consistent for properties built outside of this time period.

33

Calculated by dividing -.007/-.009/-.030 (the decrease in the likelihood of foreclosure) by .0586
(the mean foreclosure rate).
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Table 10: Hennepin County Linear Probability Model Properties Built 1910-1955
Regressions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
-0.030*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
Zip Code Indicator
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Tract Controls
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Race Control
N
Y
N
Y
N
Household Control
N
Y
Y
N
N
Observations
104865
104865
104865
104865
104865
Note: The dependent variable is the likelihood of foreclosure. The control variables are omitted from
the table for brevity. Property level control is 2005 property value. 2010 census tract controls include:
population, percent of the tract under 18, proportion of the population that is white, housing
occupancy rate, median income, and tract population density.
Covenant
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Appendix C

Minneapolis Regressions

In order to include the past control variables in my regressions, I need to restrict my
sample to Minneapolis. The past control variable data comes from the 1950 Decennial
Census obtained from the National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS).
Neighborhood controls from 1950 are important because these data capture demographic
characteristics during the time that racially restrictive language was written into property
deeds. The data includes proportion of the population that is white, median income,
and home ownership rates. However, running these regressions has drawbacks as well.
First, my sample size drastically decreases, going from about 26,000 observations to
about 8,000 observations. Secondly, control variables from 1950 are measured after
covenants have been established in my sample of houses built between 1945-1951. Thus,
these control level observations may be impacted by racial covenants and including
the control variable might mask some of the effect of the covenant. Nevertheless,
running these regressions is an important robustness check. Table 11 shows the results
from a preliminary linear probability model. Figure 10 demonstrates the regression
discontinuity around the 1948 Supreme Court Ruling. Finally, Table 12 shows the
results from the fuzzy regression discontinuity regressions. The results demonstrate
a negative relationship between covenants and foreclosure in Minneapolis. While the
significance changes between regression specifications, the coefficients remain negative.
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Table 11: Minneapolis Preliminary Property Level Regressions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
-0.047*** -0.008
-0.009
-0.007
-0.008
(0.007)
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Zip Code Indicator
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
2010 Tract Controls
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
1950 Tract Controls
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
2010 Race Control
N
Y
N
Y
N
1950 Race Controls
N
Y
N
Y
N
2010 Household Control
N
Y
Y
N
N
1950 Household Control
N
Y
Y
N
N
Observations
7986
7986
7986
7986
7986
Note: The outcome variable is the likelihood of foreclosure. The independent variable of interest is a
binary variable representing whether or not the property had a racial covenant. The control variables
are omitted from the table for brevity. Property level control is 2005 property value. 2010 census tract
controls include: population, percent of the tract under 18, proportion of the population that is white,
housing occupancy rate, median income, and tract population density. Past controls in 1950 include:
average home value, median income, and percent of the population that was white.
Covenant

Table 12: Minneapolis Fuzzy RD Property Level Regressions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
-0.071*** -0.015
-0.018
-0.018
-0.008
(0.014)
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.007)
Zip Code Indicator
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
2010 Tract Controls
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
1950 Tract Controls
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
2010 Race Control
N
Y
N
Y
N
1950 Race Controls
N
Y
N
Y
N
2010 Household Control
N
Y
Y
N
N
1950 Household Control
N
Y
Y
N
N
Observations
7986
7986
7986
7986
7986
Note: The outcome variable is the likelihood of foreclosure. The independent variable of interest is a
binary variable representing whether or not the property had a racial covenant. The control variables
are omitted from the table for brevity. Property level control is 2005 property value. 2010 census tract
controls include: population, percent of the tract under 18, proportion of the population that is white,
housing occupancy rate, median income, and tract population density. Past controls in 1950 include:
average home value, median income, and percent of the population that was white.
Covenant
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Figure 10: Minneapolis Regression Discontinuity Graph
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Appendix D

Location of Properties Built in 1947
and 1949

An underlying assumption of my identification strategy is that houses built immediately
before and immediately after the 1948 Supreme Court ruling deeming racial covenants
unenforceable are built in the same areas of the county. The local average treatment
effect (LATE) identified in my fuzzy regression discontinuity model is identified based
on these properties. If the properties are built in significantly different areas, then I
would be comparing fundamentally different groups. Fortunately, Figures 11 and 12
demonstrate that properties built in 1947 and 1949 are located in the same areas of the
county.

55

Figure 11: Properties Built in 1947 Throughout Hennepin County

Note: The location of the 3,985 properties built in 1947 throughout Hennepin County
are represented by the purple dots in the map.
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Figure 12: Properties Built in 1949 Throughout Hennepin County

Note: The location of the 4,478 properties built in 1947 throughout Hennepin County
are represented by the orange dots in the map.
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Appendix E
E.1

Falsification Tests

Arbitrary Supreme Court Ruling

A key concern of this study is attributing the impact of other forms of residential
segregation on foreclosure outcomes to racial covenants. To understand if racial covenants
have explanatory power, I run regressions using an arbitrary Supreme Court ruling. In
this specification, my sample includes properties built between 1930 and 1940. Table 13
is a linear probability model showing a significant negative relationship between racial
covenants and foreclosure outcomes. However, in order to truly understand if racial
covenants have explanatory power, I implement an arbitrary Supreme Court ruling in
1935. As seen in Table 14, after running my fuzzy regression discontinuity specification,
the coefficient on my preferred specification in column 5 loses significance. These results
suggest that the true 1948 Supreme Court ruling does have explanatory power. Racial
covenants help explain some of the variation of foreclosure outcomes in the early 2000s.
Table 13: Linear Probability Model Properties Built 1930-1940
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
-0.022*** -0.009** -0.007* -0.012*** -0.010***
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004)
Zip Code Indicator
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Tract Controls
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Race Control
N
Y
N
Y
N
Household Control
N
Y
Y
N
N
Observations
13910
13910
13910
13910
13910
Note: The outcome variable is the likelihood of foreclosure. The independent variable of interest is a
binary variable representing whether or not the property had a racial covenant. The control variables
are omitted from the table for brevity. Property level control is 2005 property value. 2010 census tract
controls include: population, percent of the tract under 18, proportion of the population that is white,
housing occupancy rate, median income, and tract population density.
Covenant
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Table 14: Arbitrary 1935 Supreme Court Ruling IV-RD
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
-0.317** -0.144
-0.173
-0.129
-0.161
(0.126) (0.108) (0.120) (0.118) (0.134)
Zip Code Indicator
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Tract Controls
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Race Control
N
Y
N
Y
N
Household Control
N
Y
Y
N
N
Observations
13910
13910
13910
13910
13910
Note: The outcome variable is the likelihood of foreclosure. The independent variable of interest is a
binary variable representing whether or not the property had a racial covenant. The control variables
are omitted from the table for brevity. Property level control is 2005 property value. 2010 census tract
controls include: population, percent of the tract under 18, proportion of the population that is white,
housing occupancy rate, median income, and tract population density.
Covenant

E.2

Excluding High Past Property Values

Brooks (2011) finds that houses with mid-range home values were more likely to be
covenanted. High-end homes were not as likely to be covenanted because the price of
the house excluded many minorities from moving into the neighborhood; covenants
were not necessary to maintain a racially homogeneous neighborhood. Therefore, racial
covenants were more likely to be placed in middle income neighborhoods. I have the
average census tract property value from 1950 for the city of Minneapolis obtained from
the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series National Historical Geographic Information
System (IPUMS NHGIS) (Manson et al., 2020). In the following regressions, I only
include properties that are less than the 75th percentile for home value in 1950 in the city
of Minneapolis. Unfortunately, I can only do this specification for the city of Minneapolis
because home value in 1950 is not available for all of Hennepin County. Furthermore, I
cannot conduct this falsification test with present day home values because covenants
have impacted present day home values. Lastly, excluding high home values from 1950
may be a lower bound on the impact that covenant have on foreclosure because home
values in 1950 have likely already been affected by racial covenants. Nonetheless, Tables
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15 and 16 present results consistent with my earlier specifications. Racial covenants
decrease the likelihood of foreclosure during the financial crisis at the 5% significance
level.
Table 15: Linear Probability Model Excluding High Past Property Values
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
-0.042*** -0.031* -0.027 -0.041** -0.037**
(0.015)
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
(0.018)
Zip Code Indicator
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
2010 Tract Controls
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
1950 Tract Controls
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
2010 Race Control
N
Y
N
Y
N
1950 Race Controls
N
Y
N
Y
N
2010 Household Control
N
Y
Y
N
N
1950 Household Control
N
Y
Y
N
N
Observations
4072
4072
4072
4072
4072
Note: The outcome variable is the likelihood of foreclosure. The independent variable of interest is a
binary variable representing whether or not the property had a racial covenant. The control variables
are omitted from the table for brevity. Property level control is 2005 property value. 2010 census tract
controls include: population, percent of the tract under 18, proportion of the population that is white,
housing occupancy rate, median income, and tract population density. Past controls in 1950 include:
average home value, median income, and percent of the population that was white.
Covenant

Table 16: Fuzzy RD-IV Model Excluding High Past Property Values
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Covenant
-0.128** -0.057
-0.054
-0.075 -0.037**
(0.055) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.018)
Zip Code Indicator
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
2010 Tract Controls
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
1950 Tract Controls
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
2010 Race Control
N
Y
N
Y
N
1950 Race Controls
N
Y
N
Y
N
2010 Household Control
N
Y
Y
N
N
1950 Household Control
N
Y
Y
N
N
Observations
4072
4072
4072
4072
4072
Note: The outcome variable is the likelihood of foreclosure. The independent variable of interest is a
binary variable representing whether or not the property had a racial covenant. The control variables
are omitted from the table for brevity. Property level control is 2005 property value. 2010 census tract
controls include: population, percent of the tract under 18, proportion of the population that is white,
housing occupancy rate, median income, and tract population density. Past controls in 1950 include:
average home value, median income, and percent of the population that was white.
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E.3

Covenants in Minority Communities

Previous literature documents that foreclosures are concentrated in minority communities
(Avre, 2014; Hall et al., 2015; Gilderbloom et al., 2012). To understand if covenants have
explanatory power within minority communities, I conduct two falsification tests with
restricted samples. Table 17 displays the fuzzy regression discontinuity results restricted
to census tracts with less than the median percentage of the population that is white.34
The sample is restricted to 130 census tracts. The covenant rate is about the same
as the covenant rate in my main sample while the foreclosure rate is slightly higher.35
The results indicate a negative relationship between racial covenants and foreclosure
outcomes. However, the results are no longer significant.
Table 17: 2010 Census Tracts with Less than the Median proportion of the Population
that is White Fuzzy RD Regressions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
-0.017** -0.008
-0.010
-0.009
-0.011
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Zip Code Indicator
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Tract Controls
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Race Control
N
Y
N
Y
N
Household Control
N
Y
Y
N
N
Observations
12587
12587
12587
12587
12587
Note: The outcome variable is the likelihood of foreclosure. The independent variable of interest is a
binary variable representing whether or not the property had a racial covenant. The control variables
are omitted from the table for brevity. Property level control is 2005 property value. 2010 census tract
controls include: population, percent of the tract under 18, proportion of the population that is white,
housing occupancy rate, median income, and tract population density.
Covenant

Restricting my sample to census tracts with proportion of the population that is
white is helpful empirically, it does not address my primary concern as these census tracts
are still predominantly white. Therefore, I run a second falsification test restricting
my sample to census tracts that have a majority-minority population.36 The results of
34

The median tract percentage of the population that is white is 83.6% in Hennepin County.
Covenant rate is 21.74% and foreclosure rate is 6.04%.
36
A majority-minority population is a census tract with less than 50% of the population being white.
35
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the fuzzy regression discontinuity model of my restricted sample reported in Table 18
indicate that there is no relationship between racial covenants and foreclosure outcomes.
However, the covenant rate within these census tracts is 5.89%, a quarter of the covenant
rate in my larger sample. This suggests, that these predominantly minority communities
were likely maintained due to a lack of racial covenants, which is consistent with my
conceptual model. Furthermore, the foreclosure rate is four times higher than the
larger sample at 19.69%. Consistent with the literature, foreclosures are overwhelming
occurring in predominately minority communities.
Table 18: 2010 Majority-Minority Census Tracts Fuzzy RD Regressions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
0.027
0.023
0.023
0.021
0.021
(0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047)
Zip Code Indicator
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Tract Controls
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Race Control
N
Y
N
Y
N
Household Control
N
Y
Y
N
N
Observations
1376
1376
1376
1376
1376
Note: The outcome variable is the likelihood of foreclosure. The independent variable of interest is a
binary variable representing whether or not the property had a racial covenant. The control variables
are omitted from the table for brevity. Property level control is 2005 property value. 2010 census tract
controls include: population, percent of the tract under 18, proportion of the population that is white,
housing occupancy rate, median income, and tract population density.
Covenant
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